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Abstract: The interpretation of the European con-
vention on human rights has been shaped by rich 
jurisprudence of the European Court of human 
rights which on several occasions had to resort 
to so-called evolutive interpretation based on the 
concept of European consensus. This article focu-
ses on basic elements of the interpretation of the 
Convention ant its position in the application of 
conventional rights. It gives first a general histori-
cal presentation, then deals with different perspec-
tives playing a role for a better understanding of 
evolutive interpretation and finishes with a gene-
ral presentation of European consensus which is a 
key element for evolutive interpretation.
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Resumo: A interpretação da Convenção Europeia 
sobre Direitos Humanos foi moldada pela rica ju-
risprudência do Tribunal Europeu de Direitos Hu-
manos que em várias ocasiões teve que recorrer à 
chamada interpretação evolutiva baseada no con-
ceito de consenso europeu. Este artigo enfoca os 
elementos básicos da interpretação da Convenção 
e sua posição na aplicação dos direitos conven-
cionais. Dá, em primeiro lugar, uma apresentação 
histórica geral, em seguida, lida com diferentes 
perspectivas desempenhando um papel para uma 
melhor compreensão da interpretação evolutiva e 
termina com uma apresentação geral do consenso 
europeu, que é um elemento-chave para a interpre-
tação evolutiva.
Palavras-chave: Convenção Europeia dos Direitos 
Humanos. Interpretação evolutiva. Consenso eu-
ropeu. Contenção judicial. Ativismo judicial.
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Historical foundation of the Convention
An institutionalized version of the European protection of human rights was conceived 
in the aftermath of the Second World War as a reaction to all atrocities having resulted from State 
dictatorship and totalitarianism, in order to face a future potential failure of States with respect to 
the protection of human dignity.2 The text of the Convention has been inspired by the Universal 
Declaration of Human rights adopted in Paris in 1948. Conventional system of human rights 
protection is based on the article 1 of the Convention, which reads: “The High Contracting parties 
shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of 
this Convention.” This shows, firstly, a clear positioning of both types of „international players“ – 
States that bear obligations on one hand and on the other hand individuals which are beneficiaries 
(recipients or holders) of rights and freedoms listed in the Convention or additional protocols to 
it. Secondly, it shows (and it is also to be seen in contradictory ruling before the Court) a clear 
opposition between the parties to the procedure. States – being a respondent party and individuals 
being always claimant (applicant). From the point of view of the creation of international norms 
on human rights, it is important to stress that States play the normative role first and then a 
procedural role of defendant party.3
Conventional system of human right protection in Europe, conceived in 1950 has however 
undergone during the years a huge transformation not only from the point of view of the number 
of contracting parties4 and changes of procedural character,5 but in substantial approach as well. 
New rights and freedoms have been added to the Convention by adopting additional protocols and 
since 1979 the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter “the Court” or “the ECtHR”) has ruled 
that the Convention is seen as a “living instrument”.6 This has served for an evolutive approach 
in the process of interpretation of the Convention. Thus, in the situation of ECHR – evolutive 
interpretation lies within the concept of the Convention as “a living instrument”, to be interpreted 
in “present-day conditions”7 where the protection of rights embedded in it must be “practical and 
effective and not theoretical and illusory”.8
2  It is worth to note that the term (human) dignity appears neither in the text of the Preamble to the Convention, nor in 
its operative articles. “Inherent dignity of all human dignity” serves to support the abolition of death penalty and one can 
read it in the Preamble to the additional Protocol n° 13 to the Convention.
3  In human rights adjudication and especially in discrimination issues, one may have a feeling that a violation is somehow 
presumed, in these situations where a municipal legal framework does not have clear, argumentized and supported position. 
Or in other cases where it is enough for the applicant to contend his/her psychological suffering without any specific proof.
4  Starting with 10 founding States and reaching the number 47 at the beginning of the 21 century. 
5  The procedural system was based on two judicial bodies first, European commission and European Court of Human rights 
both with a limited access for individuals. Those bodies were joint in 1998 to form a unique international judicial organ 
with an open access by individuals.
6  ECtHR judgement in the case Tyrer v. United Kingdom, no. 5856/72, 28 April 1978
7  Tyrer v. UK case, ECtHR judgment in the case Marckx v. Belgium, 13 June 1979, no. 6833/74
8  ECtHR judgment in the case Airey v. Ireland, 9 October 1979, no. 6289/73.
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1 Evolutive interpretation
The phenomenon of evolutive interpretation can be grasped in a limited way solely as an 
interpretative method (or technique) within the framework of rules of interpretation of international 
treaties specified in the Art. 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on Law of the Treaties. However, 
broader approach and larger perspectives could be mentioned in this regard. Those perspectives give 
a rather solid foundation for a general understanding of the phenomenon of evolutive interpretation. 
Five main perspectives9 are going to be presented. But it means there might be more of them, or 
different aspects of one can be portrayed separately.
a) Theoretical perspective – judicial activism and judicial self-restraint
Judicial activism or judicial self-restraint are theoretical approaches to judicial activity of 
higher courts in general (the theory was firstly employed for the U.S. Supreme Court). Some authors 
put a relationship between those approaches into a “tension between continuity and creativity” 
(Cox, 1987). Judicial activism approach was also widely debated with respect to the decision-making 
activity of the Court, and so for the purposes evolutive interpretation (e.g. Marckx v. Belgium case). 
Different theoretical analyses and outcomes have been presented since. Mahoney (1990) opined 
that “as far as the European Convention on Human Rights is concerned, the dilemma of activism 
versus restraint is more apparent than real.” (pp. 57-59). And he concludes: “judicial activism and 
judicial self-restraint are not diametrically opposed and irreconcilable attitudes to adjudication but 
are rather essential and complementary components of the process of on-going enforcement of the 
Convention´s fundamental rights through judicial interpretation.” (Mahoney, 1990, p. 88). Judge 
Popović (2009), while speaking about judicial activism points out that those “basic approaches are 
to some extent parallel”,  she finally concludes on certain predominance of judicial activism over 
self-restraint (“A range of various techniques used by the Court, such as evolutive interpretation, 
innovative interpretation, interpretation contrary to the drafters’ intent, and autonomous concepts, 
prove that judicial activism has prevailed in the Court’s jurisprudence.”) (Popović, 2009, p. 396). If in 
general, this conclusion of judge Popović seems to be acceptable and logically justified by previous 
jurisprudential activity of the Court, it does not establish per se any adjudicatory limit to the so-
called activism of the Court. And so, the Court has to face different types of reluctance especially 
from the side of contracting States. (Cf. 2018 Draft Copenhagen Declaration, where the High Level 
Conference states in point 14 that: 
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[it] affirms the importance of securing the ownership and support of human rights by all people in 
Europe, underpinned by those rights being protected predominantly at national level by State authorities 
in accordance with their constitutional traditions and in light of national circumstances. (italics are mine).
The wording of this paragraph was criticized in the Court´s Opinion on the draft 
Copenhagen Declaration and has not been finally adopted by the Conference.
b) Practical perspective - intentionalism and textualism revisited
Intentionalism and/or textualism is another topic closely related to evolutive interpretation. 
I may even claim that this is a second side of the same coin to judicial restraint. Textualism or 
intentionalism in material way correspond to what judicial self-restraint is in theoretical and 
procedural way. And in the same stance, evolutive interpretation (or purposive interpretation) 
corresponds to judicial activism. Put it in other words, if on one hand judicial activism or self-
restraint represent a theoretical approach to adjudicatory activity of the Court, intentionalism and 
textualism, and evolutive interpretation on the other hand are practical manifestations of those 
theoretical approaches. As for judicial activism, textualism/intentionalism are originally linked 
with U.S. Supreme Court adjudicatory activity. For the purposes of the Convention, Letsas (2007, 
p. 60) speaks about originalist theories. He differentiates textualism which “argues that a legal 
provision must mean what it was taken to mean originally, i.e. at the time of enactment” from 
intentionalism which claims “that a legal provision must apply to whatever cases the drafters had 
originally intended it to apply.” As Popović’s conclusion was the predominance of judicial activism 
over self-restraint, Letsas’s conclusion is a failure of originalist theories and a predominance of object 
and purpose approach with respect to the interpretation of the ECHR. Recently, the contradiction 
between textualism and purposive approach has been somehow conciliated by judge Sicilianos in 
the case Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary.10 In his separate opinion, referring to the evolutive 
interpretation he claims that “this interpretative method allows the text of a convention to be 
continuously adapted to “present-day conditions”, without the need for the treaty to be formally 
amended. The evolutive interpretation is intended to ensure the treaty’s permanence. The “living 
instrument” doctrine is a condition sine qua non for the Convention’s survival!” Sicilianos stressed 
then as well the importance of travaux préparatoires for the interpretation of the Convention, 
however assigning to them the role of subsidiary means. 
10  GCh. Judgment, 8 November 2016, Application no. 18030/11.
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c) Political perspective – Issue of sovereignty of Contracting States (doctrine of 
in dubio mitius)
Very much related to the judicial activism or progressive interpretation, the issue of 
sovereignty of Contracting States is at stake here. If the contradiction between judicial activism 
and judicial restraint was wrapped up as a theoretical adjudicative approach, textualism and 
purposive interpretation its practical manifestation, sovereignty issues with respect to the evolutive 
interpretation reflects rather legal-political aspects in international law and relations in the framework 
of regional human rights protection. Two different approaches are at stake here: a traditional one, 
meaning that in the situation of doubts international treaty – the Convention – should be interpreted 
restrictively in order to protect state sovereignty. And a new one claiming that in case of doubts the 
Convention should be interpreted with regard to larger human rights protection (what supports 
more judicial activism etc.). The doctrine of in dubio mitius is highly related to classical international 
law and restrictive theory of interpretation. It was widely developed by the Permanent Court of 
International Justice in the Lotus jurisprudence. Nowadays, in dubio mitius maxim is seen rather as 
an interpretative presumption which is far to be applied for international treaties on human rights. 
In this case, it is the presumption of effectiveness (effet utile) which is used by adjudicatory bodies 
(Herdeger, 2012). For the sake of reconciliation between sovereignty issues mirrored in cultural-
societal situations of Contracting States and the principle of effectiveness, the Court has created 
through its jurisprudence the doctrine of margin of appreciation. Macdonald (1993) puts it in these 
words: to “avoid damaging confrontations between the Court and Contracting States over their 
respective spheres of authority and enables the Court to balance the sovereignty of Contracting 
Parties with their obligations under the Convention.” (p. 123).
d) Structural perspective – characteristics feature of the ECHR, sui generis 
character leading to constitutionalism?
Still the same pattern, but now seen from another perspective, where one may focus 
his attention to specific characteristic of the European Convention on Human Rights. ECHR is 
far from being classical international treaty, creating reciprocal rights and obligations to States. 
Here, the individual is a unique holder of rights opposite to States. Thus, the conventional system 
creates a special situation where we can speak about the European public order, what the Court 
expressed in its ruling in Ireland v. UK case:11 “Unlike international treaties of the classic kind, 
the Convention comprises more than mere reciprocal engagements between contracting States. It 
creates, over and above a network of mutual, bilateral undertakings, objective obligations which, in 
11  Cf. ECtHR judgment in Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, Application no. 5310/71, §239.
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the words of the Preamble, benefit from a “collective enforcement”.) Again here, we may observe a 
certain tension between treating the Convention as pure international treaty with for example rules 
of interpretation, position of states and their autonomy on one hand, and the Convention and its 
case-law creating a unique constitutionalized order for the region. 
e) Consequential perspective – the question of predictability (legal certainty)
Last topic of reference to evolutive interpretation sorts out a little from previous patterns 
as it touches more States´ perspective applicability. It thus may be grasped as a consequence of 
aforementioned different perspectives. Tensions portrayed before can have for States as consequence 
a lower threshold of predictability perception, especially in delicate societal issues or issues where 
margin of appreciation has been till now used.  Arises thus the question whether and how States 
can themselves be aware of the evolution and when necessary change their national legislation in 
order not to violate the Conventional rights.
All those topics, five perspectives, relate closely and intervene somehow in the sole 
phenomenon of evolutive interpretation and its possible limits. The Court assesses the changes in 
societal issues through the technique of the European consensus. The technique was, especially at 
the beginning, widely criticized by many authors for the lack of transparency, legal predictability 
and low level of legal certainty (Dzehtsiarou, 2015, p. 115).12 Nowadays, the Court and its research 
unit provide for a better understanding and offer empirical data on national legislation of the issue 
at stake (Wildhaber, Hjartarson, & Donelly, 2013). The European consensus is mostly based on 
national legislation of Council of Europe member States only. Sometimes the Court refers to other 
instruments – international treaties, soft law documents etc., what is now and then criticized for 
being a judicial activism. One can understand the need of the Court to ascertain what the present-
day conditions are. What is triggering in this regard is the fact the Court does it especially on the 
basis of national legislations and does not introduce any other values which might be taken into 
consideration to support its argumentation. It is fascinating to see the easiness of the process, a 
quite simple arithmetic counting the Court does to examine whether there is a change in societal 
perception of the issue at stake or not.
From the Court’s perspective, the evolutive interpretation is not based upon subsequent 
practice,13 but rather perceived as changes in societal and/or delicate issues. This fact confirms again 
the specific feature of the Convention as a human rights treaty. It would be difficult to perceived 
societal changes in Contracting States as mere subsequent practice to the treaty within the meaning 
of the Art. 31 § 3 (b), which stipulates: that shall be taken into account, together with the context – 
12  For a developed survey of those critical approaches cf. Dzehtsiarou (2015).
13  For general survey on subsequent practice cf. Nolte (2013). 
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any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties 
regarding its interpretation. This subsequent practice thus should lead to an agreement (Crawford, 
2013, p. 30),  what is not the case when the Court has to deal “only” with the European consensus. 
But what is triggering more is a total reliance of the Court to changes in societal issues. To put it in 
more stringent way, one may ask, whether and to what extent the Court is “bound” by the consensus 
among Contracting States in any situations of changes of societal issues. Should the Court respect all 
the “democratic principle” of creation of new evolutive interpretation? I could say YES, at least the 
Court should respect the democratic procedures and national law-making procedures at national level. 
Even though they might be guided by political opportunism, ideologies etc.
Yes, the Court should respect it provided for national laws aim to the human rights 
protection. And this is in my view the stumbling block of the whole story. The Court relies on 
consensus among member states which subsequently leads to the evolution in interpretation of 
the human rights norms without assessing whether this “subsequent practice” of states is by itself 
conforming the human rights protection. The Court takes it as an evolution in societal perception.
2 European consensus – definition and area of application
European consensus helped many times the ECtHR to find a way for an evolutive 
interpretation of ECHR. Thus, technically speaking, the European consensus is a tool (or one of the 
tools) of interpretation. It would amount to an over-estimation, if one speaks about a comprehensive 
interpretative technique. The Court when resorting to European consensus bases its argumentation 
usually on comparative studies of the national legal orders of the member States of the Council of Europe. 
Sometimes a municipal law comparison is sufficient, sometimes the Court relies also on international 
instruments (be it of hard law14 or soft law15 character), or other municipal laws of third countries.
Although, the technical aspect seems to be clear,16 one lacks a clear definition of European 
Consensus which covers the scope of employment and its jurisprudential and/or interpretative 
impact. A national judge may see in this technique a specific type of judicial activity leading to 
re-create “international” norms. Martens (2008, p. 83),  when seeking for a clear definition, tries 
to answer the question, whether European consensus is a legal or sociologic notion. Especially, in 
earlier judgments of the Court when the term of European consensus has not yet been crystalized, 
the Court used expressions such as: common approach, increased societal acceptation, common 
European approach, common denominator or others (see above 2.) – notions which refer more to 
proper sociological reality, than to legal conception. Meanwhile, the Court has to always analyse 
14  European Social Charter
15  Council of Europe Committee of Minsters recommendations.
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“legal materiel” (Martens, 2008, p. 83). Nowadays, it is evident that “European consensus” is not 
one autonomous concept, the Court uses in its case-law.17 It is not a term the Court would fill with 
content through its jurisprudential activity. To the contrary, European consensus is more a shortcut 
to describe a certain use of argumentation or argumentative elements being based on the comparative 
method. The proper role of the Court, when examining a rather delicate issue, is to decide whether in 
a particular case the European consensus exists and thus there has been an evolution in societal-legal 
perception of the situation (e.g. requirement for irreversible changes of sex for a transgender person18) 
and the margin for appreciation has been limited considerably. Or unlike, the European consensus has 
not been established yet, there is maybe a certain tendency, a trend, and thus there is still a space for 
national manoeuvring. Kovler (2008) presents a conclusion on that point: 
It is clear that consensus in the Convention sense does not mean the unanimity that is needed 
for treaty amendment. It is more an expression of the common ground required for the collective 
approach underlying the Convention system and the interaction between the European and 
domestic systems (p. 20).
One can see, the Court is using the term consensus in a new unusual meaning. Uniformity 
(agreement in opinion)19 has turned to a common tendency or statistical majority. According to 
Dzehtsiarou (2015), “some commentators have taken up these concerns and have argued that the 
Court should use the term ´trend´ instead of ´consensus´, and concludes that the term ´trend´ 
better reflects the reality.” (p. 13). By using the term consensus, the Court has created a “new 
terminological reality”, a new semantic phenomenon. It remains to be seen, what is rather unclear, 
in what situation the Court resorts to the use of European consensus argumentation. In the first 
cases, it was only at the request of applicants, even of third parties (NGOs) and relied on their fact 
findings in that matter. Nowadays, the ECtHR makes use of its proper research division which 
examines municipal law of the Council of Europe members in a particular situation.
The usage of European consensus, as a specific technique of interpretation of the 
Convention, is not limited to particular article/s of the ECHR. Rather it is open to all legal notions 
with a different possibility of various interpretations. As already stated, we could see that European 
consensus is not limited to so-called relative rights (Arts. 8 to 11 of the Convention), where the 
interference of governmental authorities might be permitted and thus in accordance with the 
international obligation of contracting States ensuing from the Convention. Even in the very first 
case where the Court has resorted to the consensual technique of interpretation, it has analysed the 
absolute right of prohibition of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment.20 And so, Art. 3 of the 
17  The Court jurisprudence has abundantly formulated a different autonomous concept related to the notions in the Con-
vention, e.g. direct or indirect victim, family life, court, remedy.
18  ECtHR judgment in case A.P., Garçon et Nicot v. France, 79885/12, 52471/13 et 52596/13 from 6 Avril 2017.
19  Consensus – an opinion that all members of a group agree with. Oxford Advanced Learner´s dictionary. OUP, 2000.
20  Cf. Tyrer case.
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Convention has been tackled, in other cases where the Court had recourse to some extent to the 
European consensus technique of interpretation.21 Nevertheless, till now the European consensus 
has been used by the Court mostly in cases dealing with the interpretation of Arts. 8, 10 and 14 
of the Convention.22 Consequently, the Court in its rich jurisprudence has used in many different 
cases either an established European consensus to find out the violation of the Convention, or a not 
yet established consensus (a mere trend23) to rule on a non-violation of the Convention. Usually, 
when it comes to not yet defined European consensus, a mere trend.
From the statistical point of view, Art. 8 (right to private and family life) provides for an 
extensive implementation of the technique of European consensus.24
The main question now remains, whether all these issues can be regarded as societal 
phenomena and thus be subject to pure societal changes. In different words, in terms of a European 
consensus or a commonly accepted approach, can we make some difference between the right of 
prisoners to vote (Hirst), collective bargaining obligations (Sørensen and Rasmussen), full-face veil 
issues (S.A.S.), surrogacy issue (Manesson and Lebassee), the right to family life for a homosexual 
couple adopting children (X. and others), right of transgender (Goodwinn) or abortion as one of the 
reproductive rights (A.B.C.)? We contend that human nature is the same, subject to no changes 
with regard to societal values. Louis Henkin (2009) puts this idea even for human rights in general 
terms when he writes: “Human rights are universal: they belong to every human being in every 
human society. They do not differ with geography or history, culture or ideology, political or 
economic system, or stage of development.” (p. 288). If there is an “evolution” (of human nature), 
it is the situation where a new aspect of human nature has been unveiled.25 Human nature, as 
unchangeable, is strictly linked to human dignity. To affirm that both, human nature and human 
dignity can evolve in accordance to societal changes would be to void the term of (human) nature 
of its meaning.26 Human dignity is an element present in the case-law of the Court,27 however in its 
rulings this phenomenon plays hardly the role of a building block of the argumentation. Extra-legal 
character of the concept of human dignity puts the Court in the area where it does not want to be, 
to wit the area of philosophical argumentation.
21  E.g. Barar Ahmad and Others v. United Kingdom, Öcalan v. Turkey, Cruz Varas ans Others v. Sweden, Vinter and Others 
v. United Kingdom.
22  Other articles of the Convention were dealt with to a lesser extent or not at all (Art. 7 or Art. 13). 
23  Cf. Wildhaber, Hjartarson, & Donelly (2013, p. 257).
24  From more than one hundred cases where the European consensus has been used at least 25% of the time deal with the 
interpretation of the right to private or family life. More than 10% relate to Art. 14 (prohibition of discrimination) and less 
than 10 % to Art. 3 (prohibition of torture). Other substantial articles of the Convention are touched only slightly by the 
European consensus technique. 
25  A typical, non-controversial example is the abolition of the death penalty. European consensus between contracting par-
ties to the additional Protocol no. 6 to the Convention shows that a basic aspect of human nature (life) has to be preserved 
even in the situation of a state´s criminal sanction. Moreover, statistics have shown that the death penalty deterrence has 
no evidential effect and there might be a lot of miscarriages of justice.
26  We are not able, here, to answer the old question of legal philosophy about the process of creation of these norms on 
human nature. In different words to answer the question who or what rules on what is human nature.
27  Tyrer case, Pretty case, Bouid case and many others where the Court expressed its view theat human dignity is the very 
essence of the Convention.
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Conclusion
There are different method of interpretation which are used by international judicial 
bodies to interpret international treaties. Evolutive interpretation has been largely implemented in 
judicial work of the European Court of Human rights. Nevertheless, interpretative method based 
of the evolution of societal issues and thus, new understanding of terms of the Convention does 
not exist in a vacuum. The Convention (as a living instrument) “lives” in very concrete and real 
circumstances which form the whole social-judicial-political reality in Europe. That is why five 
different perspectives have been presented. Those elements – judicial activism, textualism, issue of 
sovereignty, sui generis character of the Convention and the question of predictability – have been 
presented to show that the evolutive interpretation in the reality of human rights treaties has to 
be understand in broad spectrum. The same goes for the phenomenon of European Consensus, 
which is a specific interpretative tool used by the Court to support the evolutive interpretation. 
European consensus has been used in different cases. The Court presented its arguments in order 
to show the evolution of interpretation of different rights of the Convention. The question still 
remains whether and how changes in societal issues which reflect human rights adjudication should 
be taken into account in the process of decision about the violation of human rights based on the 
European Convention of Human Rights.
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